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A B S T R A C T
The Energy-Water-Food Nexus is one of the most complex sustainability challenges faced by the world. This is
particularly true in Brazil, where insufficiently understood interactions within the Nexus are contributing to
large-scale deforestation and land-use change, water and energy scarcity, and increased vulnerability to climate
change. The reason is a combination of global environmental change and global economic change, putting
unprecedented pressures on the Brazilian environment and ecosystems. In this paper, we identify and discuss the
main Nexus challenges faced by Brazil across sectors (e.g. energy, agriculture, water) and scales (e.g. federal,
state, municipal). We use four case studies to explore all nodes of the Nexus. For each, we analyse data from
economic and biophysical modelling sources in combination with an overview of the legislative and policy
landscape, in order to identify governance shortcomings in the context of growing challenges. We analyse the
complex interdependence of developments at the global and local (Brazilian) levels, highlighting the impact of
global environmental and economic change on Brazil and, conversely, that of developments in Brazil for other
countries and the world. We conclude that there is a need to adjust the scientific approach to these challenges as
an enabling condition for stronger science-policy bridges for sustainability policy-making.
1. Introduction
Income growth, industrialisation, economic change and globalisa-
tion are bringing global demand for energy, water and food to a point
increasingly beyond the Earth's carrying capacity [1–3]. This, in turn, is
causing environmental degradation in many tropical natural resource
exporting countries such as Brazil. Such degradation could be seen as a
simple management problem but, on closer examination, it results from
far more complex interconnections between energy, water and food
[1,4–6]. Efforts to provide integrative policy lenses with which to look
at these interconnections have been referred to as the Energy-Water-
Food Nexus approach (Nexus henceforth, see [7–11]). However, what
this approach exactly entails in practice remains unclear. We use the
term 'complex' for nexus governance to highlight that the problem
displays, in particular, four key characteristics typical of so-called
'wicked' problems [12,13]: firstly, the pervasive nature of uncertainty in
every aspect of the problem, notably both climate and socio-economic
change; secondly, the existence of many different stakeholders with
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distinct and potentially conflicting values and views; thirdly, the in-
terdependence of all aspects; and finally the limited success of existing
governance structures in implementing proposed solutions. Nexus
governance is a true ‘wicked problem’, in which “the process of solving
the problem is identical with the process of understanding its nature”
[12], and intervention changes the nature of the problem and course of
events.
Brazil provides a textbook example of the challenges arising from
the Nexus. On one hand, it is one of the regions of the planet that will be
most affected by climate change [14]. On the other, it is an economy
highly driven by and tied to global economic change, through exports
of agricultural and energy commodities. Both climate and economic
change drive environmental degradation and social challenges, at all
scales of analysis, which are allowed or amplified by the shortcomings
of the governance system. Moreover, the situation of Brazil is also a
relevant comparator for other countries that face Nexus-related chal-
lenges (e.g. large-scale land-use change, water scarcity, energy crises)
or may face them in the future. Furthermore, it is very likely that tip-
ping points in Brazil could have far-reaching consequences across the
world: for the global climate system [15,16], food supplies [17] and
land-use change emissions [18].
Nexus governance can be supported by robust science, but robust
science does not automatically lead to effective policy implementation
[9]. Engineering-oriented views [5,7,19,20] focus on searching for
optimal policy solutions in order to internalise system-wide ex-
ternalities, maximise system efficiency and minimize waste. The ap-
plication of such an approach requires the existence of sufficiently good
models to optimise Nexus governance choices [10]. But complexity
science warns of the dangers in such assumptions. Indeed, complex
interactions may lead to new and unpredictable phenomena [6,21].
Human knowledge and predictive power over a complex system is al-
ways limited, while decisions must be taken using available resources.
It is unrealistic to assume the existence, even theoretically, of an ulti-
mate Nexus planner that could optimise such a complex system.
Moreover, overreliance on optimisation has the effect of downplaying
path-dependent phenomena, such as behavioural feedbacks on tech-
nology uptake and social influence, despite their practical importance
[21]. Furthermore, path-dependence (representing the influence of
developmental, technological and socio-political histories) is not lim-
ited to what has happened in Brazil. The range of realistic options is
highly dependent upon paths taken elsewhere. The global-local inter-
action is therefore a necessary component of the analysis, which tends
to be overlooked by a focus on a hypothetical social planner optimizing
conditions in one country.
Here, we identify and discuss the main Nexus challenges faced by
Brazil. We map the existing policy landscape addressing the Nexus and
assess its performance and shortcomings. Brazil is envisaged as an in-
dicative example of what other countries in analogous positions may
face in future. The analysis of its specific challenges suggests the need
for change in how science approaches the understanding of Nexus
challenges in general. We highlight the need for more complexity-based
Nexus research, stronger integration across sectors, scales, stakeholders
and disciplines (spanning not only the natural sciences and economics,
but also law and social sciences, see [10]), and more attention paid to
the interactions between the global and the local levels. We see this
change in the scientific approach to Nexus challenges as an enabler for
stronger science-policy bridges or, in other words, for better integration
of scientific insight into policy-making.
We propose a new approach for Nexus analysis and for formulating
integrated Nexus policy strategies in the presence of partial knowledge
and understanding, and substantial uncertainty. This includes in-
tegrating science deeply in the process of policy-making, i.e. developing
a science-policy-law interface, taking inspiration from European impact
assessment procedures to identify Nexus-resilient public policy solu-
tions. Other non-optimisation approaches have been discussed in the
wider literature (e.g. [6,10,22,23], see [8] for a review of other
framings); however, none emphasise simultaneously the development
of a multi-scale complexity-based approach embedded within a deep
understanding of the science-policy-law interface, as we advocate here.
The article first summarises the general context of global environ-
mental and economic change as drivers of the Nexus challenges faced
by Brazil. This is followed by four case studies that combine economic,
scientific, legal and policy data to illustrate the intricate environmental
and social interconnections between each node of the Nexus in Brazil:
energy-water, food-energy, water-food and energy-water-food.
Significantly, the four case studies highlight the role of complexity in
Nexus challenges. We review laws and policies in place to address these
challenges and their performance. The details for each policy or law,
referred to as SI.1 to SI.25, and the online location of the associated
documents, are given in the Supplementary Information (SI). We con-
clude with a statement on how a change in the scientific approach to
the Nexus could contribute to a more functional science-policy bridge,
and how this bridge could enable the design and implementation of
Nexus-resilient public policies.
2. Review of the general context
2.1. Methodology
The methodology of this paper is organised as follows. We carry out
a review of the literature and of policy and law documents relevant for
each node of the Brazilian Nexus. We do not claim to cover the litera-
ture exhaustively for all three sectors and their linkages, as the limits
are not clearly delineated from other fields of research, and the full
literature covering all three nodes of the Nexus is too large, while most
studies do not in fact cover the full Nexus.1 Our methodology involves
explicitly reviewing each vertex of the Nexus linkages using four case
studies that cover the most important Nexus relationships. We use these
case studies to uncover structural commonalities, and build a case for
why and how complex intersectoral interactions must be seriously
taken into account when developing strategies for policy-making in all
three sectors. These case studies illustrate areas displaying clear chal-
lenges that require immediate intervention, and we use them to develop
a Nexus framework that demands a deep understanding of the science-
policy-law interface.
Building on the complexity approach of Liu et al. [6], we adopt the
philosophy of analysis of Rittel & Weber in their description of the
‘wicked problem’ [12], in which it is recognised that the process of
solving policy issues is identical with the process of understanding the
underlying drivers. This assumes incomplete information and under-
standing, and by definition sub-optimal policy-making that improves
incrementally as knowledge and understanding improves. Since for
wicked problems such as the Nexus, policy-makers typically only have
limited opportunities to act, and each policy action changes the pro-
blem itself, we argue for closer interaction between science and policy
and a recognition that the impacts of policy strategies are only ever
partially understood and require continual reassessment as more in-
formation becomes available.
2.2. Global and local environmental change
Current trajectories of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are leading
the planet towards somewhere between 3 and 6 °C of warming, unless
stringent mitigation policies are adopted worldwide [24]. These emis-
sion trajectories imply changes in average temperatures and rainfall
that are unevenly distributed, with severe variations (e.g. enhanced
floods and droughts) and increased frequency of extreme events. Brazil
is likely to experience amongst the most pronounced of these effects.
1 The Nexus literature that explicitly covers interactions between the three
sectors is in fact relatively limited, and is mostly covered in this article.
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Fig. 1 shows maps of changes in mean temperatures and rainfall in
Brazil for low and high emissions scenarios (RCPs 2.6 and 8.5). In a
scenario of continued high global emissions, temperature changes of up
to 3–6 °C could occur over the Amazonian region, potentially severely
degrading vegetation and ecosystems. Meanwhile, in such a scenario,
rainfall could be significantly disturbed, increasing by 60% in the
southern regions while it could decrease by 40% in arid regions of the
north. These changes would have serious impacts on agriculture and food
production in Brazil. However, these projections also rank amongst the
least certain globally, partly because the Amazon rainforest is intimately
connected with the local and global climate, and land use, making it
complex to predict [25,26]. These patterns of climate change and
warming are uncertain but well studied [27,28]. Brazil has recently faced
several droughts, with evidence suggesting that changing rainfall pat-
terns will lead to reduced river flows in several catchment areas [29–32].
The Brazilian rainforest is particularly sensitive to drought events [28]. A
self-reinforcing interaction exists between temperature change, drying,
forest fires, deforestation and a collapse of the Amazonian rainforest
[33,34]. In particular, drought-fire interactions generate one of the
possible tipping points [15,16]. However, here tipping points come about
through a combination of direct (e.g. LUC) and indirect (e.g. climate
change) anthropogenic factors [34].
In recent years, Brazil's Cerrado biome and the Amazon have both
been exposed to increased rainfall intensity during the wet season fol-
lowed by longer-than-usual dry seasons [35]. In 2014–2015, the state of
São Paulo experienced a severe water crisis driven by below-average
rainfall. Water in this region is supplied by moisture from the Amazon
and the South Atlantic through low-level easterly jets [36,37]. During
the drought period, the regional atmospheric circulation was blocked
by a high-pressure system in the mid-troposphere [38,39]. This barrier
changed moisture transport from the Amazon to South-Eastern Brazil.
These changes were unpredictable, but most likely have anthropogenic
roots, and could become recurrent.
A changing climate leads plant and animal species to migrate [40]
and/or evolve [41]. In Brazil, this phenomenon affects agricultural
activities, as land productivity changes with the climate [42], primarily
as a result of rainfall changes and water availability. Under severe cli-
mate change, this could involve large-scale land-use change, which
would mean significant biodiversity loss. As agricultural activities re-
organise themselves, Brazilian society itself is affected. Thus, climate
change would result in pronounced pressures on Brazilian food pro-
duction, itself accounting for a large component of economic activities
in Brazil, and of the world's food supply sources.
2.3. Global economic change driving environmental degradation
The Brazilian economy benefits from lucrative exports of agri-
cultural and food products. These account for around one third of total
Brazilian exports making Brazil one of the countries with highest export
shares in that sector (Fig. 2a). These goods have traditionally accounted
for a major component of Brazilian exports (Fig. 2b) and their pro-
duction employs a significant portion of the entire Brazilian labour
force (Fig. 2c). These figures place Brazil in a context of growing wealth
associated to exports of natural resources, driven by growing pur-
chasing power worldwide.
However, these data also signal the significant vulnerability of the
Brazilian economy. Voluminous exports of natural resources are made
lucrative by international prices, supported by high demand in many
other nations around the world (particularly Chinese imports of soy-
beans), and export growth is thus strongly driven by economic growth
in other large emerging economies [43]. This economic pressure is well
known to strain the Brazilian environment through man-made defor-
estation and land-use change that creates space to expand agriculture
(e.g. see [34]), a phenomenon often involving indirect land-use change
(ILUC).
ILUC refers to the phenomenon in which an event of land-use
change in one place induces another event of land-use change else-
where, mediated by commodity and land prices [44,45]. In Brazil, this
typically involves a hierarchy of production associated to land pro-
ductivity, where the most productive land is converted to produce new
Fig. 1. Changes in annual average rainfall (as a % change to annual averages) and mean temperature, in the summer (top panels) and the winter (bottom panels), for
low cumulative global GHG emissions (left panels) and high cumulative emissions (right panels). In scenarios of high emissions, temperature changes of up to 6 °C are
expected over the Amazonian region, and rainfall changes of +60% and−40% are expected in North-Eastern and Southern Brazil, respectively. These changes are
likely to lead to radical changes in vegetation and land cover, including desertification. CMIP5 data obtained through the KNMI Climate Explorer. More information
on models and methodology can be found on the website (https://climexp.knmi.nl/start.cgi).
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lucrative crops for exports (e.g. soybeans, sugar cane), displacing cattle
farming, which itself moves to occupy other areas which are deforested
before use [45–47]. Deforestation in the Amazon has declined from
2004 to 2014 as authorities have managed to regulate farmers’ beha-
viour partly by law enforcement and partly by economic measures [48].
Intensification and commoditisation of agriculture also contributed to
reduced rates of deforestation [48]. However, the deforestation in the
Amazon has increased again from August 2015 to July 2016. Over the
last 30 years the Cerrado has lost 50% of its native vegetation cover.
Deforestation is likely to continue mostly because it is linked to global
markets growth for agricultural commodities, mediated by prices, and
made possible by globalisation, giving rise to powerful incentives for
agribusiness to acquire new land in Brazil [43].
Agricultural products, grown either as feedstock for biofuel pro-
duction or to feed animals, contribute to this phenomenon
[34,46,49,50]. Under climate change mitigation policy following the
Paris Agreement, global markets for biofuels are virtually unbounded
[51]. Meanwhile, under growing affluence and increasingly meat-in-
tense diets in middle-income countries, global markets for soy as animal
feed can become very large (see Section 3.5). Concerns over the sus-
tainability of biofuel mandates have raised sufficient concern in Europe
to revise this policy trajectory (see e.g. [52]), but this may not ne-
cessarily deter policy-makers in other large economies. Indeed, despite
sustainability concerns [46,50,53], biofuels remain a key component of
the national strategy of many countries to mitigate climate change
[52,54]. Thus a large global market for liquid biofuels for transport
could be expected to emerge by 2050 [55].
Estimates of the world's carrying capacity for biofuel production
[56–59] consider only land left over after global food demand has been
supplied. However, no evidence exists to suggest that food demand will
be supplied before energy demand, since biofuel consumers in some
regions can easily, and inadvertently, outbid food consumers in others
[43]. Brazil will very likely face this intricate problem.
2.4. Overview of the domestic policy landscape addressing the Nexus in
Brazil
Climate change impacts combined with increasing global demands
for food and energy commodities expose vulnerabilities in Brazil's
water, energy and food systems, as a result of their complex inter-
connections. The government has recently acknowledged the need to
adapt existing regulation and to create new policies to manage these
challenges. Although Brazil has comprehensive water, energy and food
governance frameworks, each sector has evolved separately and is or-
ganised independently from the other two. The law and policy per-
taining to each sector only occasionally and marginally refer to issues
arising in other sectors. Such fragmentation is what makes Nexus
challenges so pressing.
The climate change framework in Brazil includes some integrative
guidance and instruments to deal with the Nexus. Since the 2000s,
Brazil has adopted climate change legislation and policies, including
the 2008 National Plan on Climate Change (SI.1) and the 2009 National
Policy on Climate Change (“NPCC” – SI.2), which establish the coun-
try's voluntary emissions reduction target and incorporate laws and
policies relating to climate change.
As part of the NPCC, the 2016 National Adaptation Plan to Climate
Change (“NAP” – SI.3) refers to goals, thematic and sectoral adaptation
strategies and guidelines, to be implemented within the timeframe of
four-year cycles. The NAP mentions explicitly the need to promote in-
teractions and synergies amongst sectors for broadening the coherence of
adaptation strategies in the context of climate change. For instance, the
NAP provides as intersectoral goals: (i) in the agriculture sector, en-
couraging farmers to adopt renewable energy sources and to promote
sustainable and efficient water use; (ii) in the energy sector, to assess
interactions between adaptive measures for water, energy and land use;
and (iii) in the water sector, to integrate water resources planning with
that of other sectors, replace current irrigation methods with more ef-
ficient ones, and promote better management of multiple-use re-
servoirs. The development of new and existing legal and policy in-
struments will require capacity building, intergovernmental
coordination, monitoring systems, and the improvement of the climate
change projections to be reflected in public policies (SI.4).
Under the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change,2 Brazil has
developed its Nationally Determined Contributions (“NDC” – SI.5)
comprising the reduced emissions targets of 1.3 GtCO2e per year by
2025 and 1.2 GtCO2e by 2030, equivalent to 37% and 43% below the
2005 level. Amongst the mitigation measures, the NDC includes: (i)
increasing biofuels to approximately 18%; (ii) implementing the Forest
Code, particularly to achieve zero illegal deforestation in the Amazon;
(iii) achieving 45% of renewables in the energy mix, amongst which
non-hydro renewable energy between 28% and 33%, and non-fossil fuel
Fig. 2. (a) Current share of total exports consisting of agricultural products and food by country (33% for Brazil). (b) Total exports, normalised to 2010. (c)
corresponding shares of employment, normalised to 2010. Data from Eurostat, OECD, national statistics, Asian Dev. Bank, UN prodcom. Differences between panels
(a) and (b) stem from whether exports are accounted for in constant or current prices.
2 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21, 12 December 2015,
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9, Annex.
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energy sources at least 23%, by raising the share of wind, biomass and
solar; and (iv) restoring degraded pasturelands and enhancing in-
tegrated cropland-livestock-forestry systems. The following issues
linked to the NDCs, however, relate to more than one sector: (i) the land
use effects on the conservation of forests; (ii) the expansion of non-
hydro energy sources and cropland-livestock forestry. At the moment
the Ministry of the Environment coordinates the development of a
National Strategy for the Implementation and Financing of the Brazilian
NDC to the Paris Agreement (SI.5).
Other examples exist of Nexus legislation in Brazil. The 2013
National Policy on Integration of Farming, Livestock and Forestry (Law
N. 12.805 – SI.6) is designed to mitigate deforestation, support best
practices to develop these sectors in a sustainable manner, and con-
tribute to the recovery of degraded areas. The 2013 National Irrigation
Policy (Law N. 12.787 – SI.7) governs the sustainable use of water for
irrigation and policy integration for water resources, environment,
energy and sanitation, giving priority to projects that allow multiple
uses of water. It includes tax incentives, rural credits and insurance,
certification of irrigation projects and technical assistance. These ex-
amples notwithstanding, Nexus challenges are only partially taken into
account in the relevant governing frameworks, if at all.
2.5. International law and policy influencing the Nexus in Brazil
Measures also exist in Brazil at the supply-chain governance level, to
improve sustainability in agricultural commodity production. These
measures include regulating or incentivising global market access by
certain products. This includes certification requirements for producers
to respect sustainability standards or the use of specific labels reflecting
abidance by such standards. They result from a coordinated effort be-
tween local governments, producers, consumer groups, others directly
involved in commodity supply-chains and civil society groups [60].
Furthermore, the global finance mechanism REDD+,3 developed
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), plays a significant role in preventing deforestation. Brazil
has received international finance from REDD+(SI.8) as a result of its
verified emissions reductions, initially prioritizing strategies in the
Amazon and most recently organizing data about the Cerrado for fur-
ther action. REDD+ is considered a valuable instrument in catalysing
international support to promote more integrated land-use policies and
practices [61].
3. Nexus analysis: four case studies
3.1. Selection of case studies of cross-sectoral interactions
This section discusses four case studies selected to chart the most
salient4 Nexus interactions relevant for Brazil as well as the short-
comings of the existing governance framework. We look at (1) the
water-energy link, focusing on water use for hydroelectricity under
increasing climate change constraints, (2) the energy-food link, fo-
cusing on the competition for land between energy and food production
sparked by biofuels policy, (3) the food-water link, focusing on the
impact of climate change on food production in Brazil, and finally, (4)
simultaneous water-energy-food links, focusing both on ILUC generated
by global demand for agricultural and bio-energy commodities pro-
duced in Brazil, and on the scarcity of suitable land resulting from
climate change. We define and apply a Nexus lens that combines eco-
nomic and biophysical modelling data with an overview of the
legislative and policy landscape, to analyse the dynamics of the Nexus
in Brazil and derive common patterns. We use these common patterns
to formulate more specifically the core components of a Nexus ap-
proach to science-informed policy-making. The goal of this paper is to
lay down the foundations of a Nexus research agenda,5 and improve the
effectiveness of existing science-policy bridges in Brazil.
3.2. Water-energy – hydroelectricity and climate change
Climate change is modifying rainfall patterns in Brazil [14,32]. A
water crisis has emerged in recent years, which has resulted in record
low levels in hydroelectric dam reservoirs [31,33]. Persistent drought
has also affected agriculture in the North-East region [29]. In the São
Paulo region, where 10% of the Brazilian population live and one third
of GDP is produced, water scarcity from 2014 to 2016 generated both
electricity blackouts and a drinking water crisis leading to the rationing
of both [33]. The water crisis is a problem of water management and
efficiency of use, but it is related to local and global environmental
change, while it affects and is governed by policy in both the water and
energy sectors simultaneously. In particular, electricity policy en-
couraging the use of water for generation of energy directly affects
drinking water availability. According to the water policy (SI.9), the
water management must promote multiple uses of water including for
the generation of energy and direct human use, except in case of water
scarcity, when priority is given to the latter. In practice, the lack of
definition of water allocation priorities causes increasing water com-
petition conflicts between the energy and water supply sectors, espe-
cially during water shortage periods and before scarcity is reached [62].
The Brazilian electricity system is largely based on hydroelectricity
(> 62.6% [63]), making it low-carbon, but also vulnerable to changes
in climate and rainfall [64,65]. The Brazilian electricity system features
219 hydroelectric dams (MME, August/2018 – SI.10), one of the largest
systems in the world [66]. The vast majority of the large-scale gen-
erators (99.5%) are connected by the National Interconnected System
(SIN – Sistema Interligado Nacional). Modelling suggests that in most
hydrological basins, river flows will decline in all climate change sce-
narios [64]. These projections place constraints on the future compo-
sition of the Brazilian electricity sector, and technological diversifica-
tion appears inevitable. This is challenging if the objective is to
simultaneously maintain low CO2 emissions, although non-hydro re-
newables could contribute to alleviate pressure on water resources
[67].
The country's overreliance on hydro became conspicuous in 2001,
when a combination of below-average rainfall and insufficient invest-
ments in new generation capacity culminated in a major electricity
supply crisis. In order to avoid blackouts, a 20% demand reduction was
required at short notice, and 22 of the 27 Brazilian states were in-
structed to implement rationing policies (using quotas, financial in-
centives and information campaigns, see [68]). These measures were in
place for less than a year, but had a lasting effect on people's energy-
use: 90% of households changed their consumption habits, with a 14%
reduction in electricity use that remained 10 years later [69]. This
suggests a large potential for efficiency improvements in the Nexus that
can be realized by targeted policies. But also, the “energy efficiency
gap” unveiled an underlying “water efficiency gap” [70].
Hydropower projects have continued to obtain the go-ahead from
authorities until the Plano Decenal de Energia – PDE, Ten Year Plan
2024, released in 2015 (SI.11). Most new dam projects are in the
Amazon basin, where most of Brazil's remaining hydroelectric potential
3 “Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in devel-
oping countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of for-
ests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries”.
4 We note that other Nexus linkages exist and could be covered, but we cannot
do so within space constraints.
5 For instance, as part of the UK research council-funded BRIDGE project
(Building Resilience In a Dynamical Global Economy: Complexity across scales
in the Food-Water-Energy Nexus). For more information, see https://www.
ceenrg.landecon.cam.ac.uk/research/the-bridge-project and http://gtr.rcuk.ac.
uk/projects?ref=ES/N013174/1.
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lies, demanding comparatively large investments to connect these to
the transmission grid, with environmental impacts associated with
flooding areas of rich biodiversity and often under indigenous occu-
pation. The implementation of the Belo Monte hydropower power plant
offers a good illustration of the emerging complexity [71]. Never-
theless, the recent Ten-Year Energy Plan 2026, released in 2017, fea-
tures less dependency on hydropower, and aims at increasing non-
hydro renewables (wind, solar, biomass) to up to 48% by 2026 (SI.11).
In 2002, the two-stage programme PROINFA (Programa de
Incentivo às Fontes Alternativas de Energia – Incentive Programme for
Alternative Sources of Electric Power – SI.12) was created to encourage
power matrix diversification with other energy sources such as wind,
solar and biomass. The goal of the first stage was to install 3300MW of
renewable energy, using subsidies and other incentives. The second
stage target was to increase the renewable energy generation (ex-
cluding hydro) to 10% of annual consumption within 20 years. The
second stage did not occur and was later replaced by the regulator
ANEEL's energy auctions. The following additional policies were cre-
ated to grant subsidies schemes for wind, solar, biomass and small
hydro plants (up to 30MW) projects (SI.12): (i) at least 50% discount
on tariffs charged by the transmission and distribution systems (Re-
solution ANEEL 77/2004); and (ii) the requirement that these sources
are the only ones available for purchase by Special Consumers (from
500 kW to 3MW) on the energy Free Trade Environment (ACL) (Law
9427/1996). The reduction in generation costs for wind power, in
particular, has led to a significant growth of its share in the electricity
mix from almost no production in 2006–10.8%, in 2018, while biomass
and solar account for, 7.9% and 0.7%, respectively (MME, 2018).
It is clear that diversification of the power grid could improve water
security, by giving hydro dams better flexibility to regulate water
supplies. The NAP (SI.3) envisions that the electricity sector planning
follows climate-change projections, notably to evaluate the “interac-
tions between adaptive measures for water, energy, land use and bio-
diversity, as a means for understanding and managing such interac-
tions”. The NAP, however, does not indicate how this goal is to become
operative in the context of long-term power plans oriented towards the
expansion of hydroelectricity. Aligned with the NDC, the recent Ten-
Year Plan for long-term power planning to 2026 reserving a propor-
tionate role for large hydropower systems and taking into account
Brazil's vast potential for low-cost solar and wind resources, could be an
approach for tackling risks to water availability. This strategy responds
to the environmental concerns surrounding backup thermal power
plants used during periods of water shortage to secure energy supply in
the national grid interconnection. Meanwhile, establishment of water
policy priorities or criteria for allocating water amongst different users
could ultimately mitigate competition for the water supply, especially
coming from the energy sector.
3.3. Food-energy – liquid biofuels and competition for land between food
and energy
The global demand for first generation liquid biofuel feedstocks
such as sugar cane, maize and soy has grown rapidly in the past decade
due to the increasing adoption of policies to decarbonise transport fuels
(using lower carbon fuels) and to support local biofuel industries (e.g.
in the US; see Fig. 3). This new demand requires a dedicated supply of
agricultural products, which has the potential to partially displace ex-
isting food production. Brazil produces a substantial share of the global
supply for agricultural commodities for biofuels, notably sugar cane
and soybeans (see Section 3.5). Prices for internationally traded agri-
cultural commodities can fluctuate widely, in connection to oil and
biofuels, leading to complex interdependencies.
Since 2008, a significant body of research has developed issuing a
stark warning regarding (i) the carbon sustainability of biofuels and (ii)
the competition for land that the development of large biofuel markets
could generate, with the potential to price out local agriculture for food
and lead to food price volatility as well as restrict access to food [e.g.
6,34,48,50,53]. These studies primarily emphasise the effects of ILUC
[44,45] as a driver of linkages across activities, environmental impacts
and markets, mediated by commodity and land prices.
The complexity of these linkages is appreciated and debated in both
science and policy circles. However, it has not yet been translated into
consensus over appropriate policy solutions, which creates uncertainty
for the development of the sector. Yet, large-scale biofuel use is con-
sidered as a necessary component of climate change mitigation sce-
narios consistent with the Paris Agreement [e.g. 51,72,73].
For present purposes, we analyse large-scale biofuel use in road
transport globally and its impact on Brazil, focusing on hypothetical
scenarios in which, by 2050, biofuel mandates are substantially in-
creased worldwide in order to implement the Paris Agreement. Global
liquid biofuel use could easily reach 5–10 EJ [73],6 which would entail
that, given land availability, comparatively low production costs and
the current advanced development of the sector, Brazilian agriculture
could be incentivised to supply a substantial fraction of these bioenergy
feedstocks. This would require large areas of additional land for su-
garcane (ethanol) and/or soybeans (biodiesel) [74]. Land areas cur-
rently available for biofuels production in Brazil amount to (i) 85.6 Mha
(excluding cropland and pastures), (ii) 41.8Mha (safeguarding pro-
tected areas), or (iii) 37.8 Mha (excluding the Amazon) [75]. Land
Fig. 3. Biofuel production, final use, imports and exports worldwide. a)
Ethanol. b) Biodiesel. The main charts show production and final use, while the
insets show imports and exports. Data from IEA World Energy Balances (2017).
6 Own calculations with the model E3ME-FTT-GENIE. For reference, current
global use of transport fuels (petrol, diesel) is 100 EJ. Existing efficiency change
and electrification trajectories reduce this quantity over time substantially in
most realistic scenarios.
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requirements for biofuel feedstocks are of between 20.2 and 2.3 ha/
1000 GJ (soybeans and sugarcane) [76]. Thus, between< 37 EJ (sugar
cane ethanol) and< 2 EJ (soybean biodiesel) of liquid biofuels can be
produced in Brazil depending on the crop used. Several EJ of biofuel
demand in Brazil could incentivise farmers to produce beyond current
limits, especially if other demands for land are simultaneously growing,
causing ILUC cascades (see Section 3.5).
Brazil's biofuel policies date back to the oil shock of 1973, and have
been historically geared towards energy security and rural develop-
ment, with limited concerns for their ecological impact and potential
competition with food production [77–80]. It was only with the com-
modity and biofuels boom of the mid-2000s that increased production
and exports raised questions of competition with food production and
of deforestation in the Cerrado and the Amazon [50,53].
In this context, Brazilian authorities took some measures to ensure
the sustainable development of biofuels. At the federal level, the main
framework regulating sugarcane expansion is the Agro-Environmental
Zoning (Zoneamento Agro-Ecológico da Cana-de-açúcar, or ZAE Cana –
SI.13). This is a planning instrument developed by the Brazilian Agri-
cultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) in collaboration with other
institutions, adopted by Decree in 2009 (Decree 6961/2009). Based on
agricultural potential, land vulnerability, climate risks and environ-
mental regulations, it defines suitable areas for the expansion of su-
garcane. ZAE Cana excludes cultivation in areas with original vegeta-
tion cover or highly bio-diverse regions, including the Amazon and
Pantanal biomes; and others (e.g. indigenous land, conservation areas).
It prioritizes expansion in under-used areas, areas occupied by livestock
and degraded pastures [81]. However, one major limitation of the
zoning is that it does not consider potential competition between su-
garcane and food production within those areas. It does not address
issues relating to water availability, energy planning or socio-economic
aspects (e.g. land prices). It remains a technical instrument of a merely
indicative nature, which aims to orientate credit allocation and in-
vestment decisions but has never been translated into binding law as
originally planned.
The state of São Paulo represents over 60% of Brazil's sugarcane
production and about 50% of ethanol production. In 2008, driven by
concerns about urban air pollution, the São Paulo state government
adopted the ‘Etanol Verde’ programme and its associated agro-en-
vironmental protocol (SI.14). Developed by the state in collaboration
with powerful sugarcane producer union UNICA, it sets guidelines to
phase out sugarcane burning for manual harvesting to replace it with
mechanical harvesting [82].7 The protocol also aims to favour water
conservation, protect biodiversity, ensure fair labour practices, and
develop environmental awareness. Based on voluntary certification by
the State, the agro-environmental protocol has benefited from UNICA's
support and has performed well. Indeed, in 2016 over 90% of the su-
garcane harvest was conducted without burning, significantly reducing
emissions of particles with harmful impacts on health, GHG emissions,
and water consumption.
In December 2017, Brazil has approved the National Biofuels Policy,
known as RenovaBio, to expand low-carbon fuels such as ethanol,
biomass and biodiesel, within its Paris Agreement NDC's commitments
(SI.15). Inspired by California's Low Carbon Fuel Standards (LCFS),
RenovaBio includes the following mechanisms: (i) targets for the GHG
emissions reduction in the fuel mix, including individual targets to fuel
distributors (ii) decarbonisation credits, (iii) biofuel certification, (iv)
addition of biofuels to fossil fuels, (v) incentives on tax, finances and
credits.
In addition to federal- and state-level legislation, some certification
schemes have emerged, driven by the adoption of sustainability re-
quirements and criteria (GHG emission reductions, biodiversity pro-
tection) in importing jurisdictions, notably the EU and US. A number of
multi-stakeholder supply-chain sustainability schemes with different
requirements have been developed [82,83]. The interest of producers
and public authorities for these schemes has been motivated by a desire
to access foreign markets. These schemes notably include Bonsucro for
ethanol (SI.16), and the Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS –
SI.17). However, uptake has been uneven [84] and it has waned as the
debates on ILUC and ‘food vs fuel’ intensified in major export markets
such as the EU, limiting the appetite for biofuels for decarbonising
transport. However, the attraction to low-carbon fuels may not be
limited by sustainability concerns in other emerging economies such as
China and India, and thus this may change again. Although the current
policy framework goes some way towards addressing environmental
issues, it has serious limitations and does not adequately address the
potential displacement of food production by energy crops. ILUC cas-
cades are likely to result from further biofuel expansion and affect de-
forestation (see Section 3.5). Precisely, RenovaBio aims to guarantee a
sustainable production of biofuels, but its environmental efficiency
methodology, under development, will most likely take into account
direct LUC but not indirect (SI.15).
3.4. Water-food – climate change impacts on food and water
In future climate change scenarios up to 2100, large areas of land
may be at risk of degradation as a result of more frequent drought in the
North and North-East of Brazil [29,85], while lands in the South are
likely to suffer from more frequent flooding and erosion [86]. A tipping
point involving the collapse of the Amazon through droughts and fires
may also be on the horizon [27,32,87]. Inhabitants of the North-East of
Brazil (the Caatinga) traditionally cope with frequent droughts [29],
but this area could undergo desertification as a result of climate change.
Under scenarios of productivity collapse, people migrate [88], and thus
agricultural activities also effectively migrate, as some farmers abandon
their land to find work in cities while other farmers plant crops that
used to be grown elsewhere [89]. Climate change will lead to sub-
stantial regional economic losses for the North-East and other areas
[90].
The effects of climate change will likely push maize, soybeans and
sugarcane grown over much of the territory to migrate, as land pro-
ductivity evolves (Fig. 4). Scenarios of land productivity changes and
yield of crop types in Brazil captured in Fig. 4 have been derived with
the latest version of the Lund-Potsdam-Jena model with managed land
(LPJmL4), a global dynamic vegetation model [92]. LPJmL is a process-
based ecosystem model that simulates the growth, production and
phenology of 13 crop functional types and managed grass (rain-fed and
irrigated). All processes are modelled at a daily resolution and on a
global 0.5◦ × 0.5◦ grid. LPJmL4 simulates the transient changes in
carbon and water cycles due to land use, specific phenology and sea-
sonal CO2 fluxes in carbon and water cycles of agricultural-dominated
areas, as well as the production of crops and grazing lands. Effectively,
the model allows for assessing a broad range of feedbacks within the
terrestrial biosphere as increasingly shaped by human activities such as
climate change and land use. It allows for simulating the management
of crops (irrigation, intercropping, treatment of residues), which leads
to different maximum levels for leave areas [91,92]. For agricultural
crops, assimilated biomass from photosynthesis is allocated at daily
steps to four carbon pools: leaves, roots, harvestable storage organs,
and a pool representing stems and mobile reserves. We ran two dif-
ferent scenarios (RCP 2.6 and 8.5) for atmospheric CO2 between 2000
and 2100 using data from the Hadley centre's climate model (HAD-
GCM) as inputs to LPJmL4.
Simulations of crop yields show that under a high emissions sce-
nario (RCP 8.5), land productivity for all four commodities decreases
substantially, except for sugarcane, which may find more suitable
conditions in the South. Productivity loss under a low emissions sce-
nario (RCP 2.6) is less pronounced but still likely to occur. Maize de-
clines steeply in the North and North-East, which could induce7 The targets are 2014 for declivity< 12%; and 2017 for declivity> 12%.
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substantial socio-economic changes. Soybeans, grown in the South and
in the Cerrado, could be constrained to the South, with substantial
impacts on exports (see Section 3.5). The cane industry, traditionally
rain-fed and situated in the São Paulo area, is currently expanding to
drier areas in the North where irrigation is required [93,94]. Finally,
pastures could also be displaced from their traditional southern heart-
land.
Brazil has experience in designing policies to deal with the effects of
climate variability on the farming sector. In 1996, the Agricultural
Climate-Risk Zoning (ZARC – Zoneamento Agrícola de Risco Climático
– SI.18) was implemented to minimize risks from adverse climate
events on crops. At that time, the ZARC was designed to reduce the
large number of payment claims faced by the rural public insurance as a
result of crop losses caused by either floods or droughts [95]. The ZARC
comprises a crop year calendar with the zoning of the most suitable
crops for each region and the best period for planting, considering the
soil conditions and the crop cycling capacities. Although not originally
developed with climate change in mind, the ZARC was incorporated to
the NAP, subject to some adjustments to include the long-term effects of
climate change on the crops. Similarly, the Agricultural Activity
Guarantee Programme (PROAGRO – SI.19) and the Family Agricultural
Activity Guarantee Programme (PROAGRO-Mais – SI.19), which insure
farmers against the commodity price variations and harvest failures
caused by climate events, have been integrated through the NAP with
other official insurance programmes previously in force to minimize
risks associated with agricultural production.
The Low-Carbon (ABC) Plan (SI.20) was created in 2011 to reduce
agricultural GHG emissions, and it includes the provision of low-in-
terest loans for farmers who implement low-carbon agricultural prac-
tices. The ABC Plan provides for climate change adaptation measures to
ensure food security, including the development of projects, research,
and the transfer of technologies (i) to increase efficiency and resilience
of agro-ecosystems, (ii) to maintain productivity under biotic and
abiotic climate change pressures, (iii) to foster sustainable and in-
tegrated uses of water and soil, and (iv) to consider the climate mod-
elling of different agricultural systems. Although several years have
elapsed since its creation, the ABC Plan is not yet fully implemented,
mostly due to lack of awareness by farmers, lack of skilled technical
assistance amongst farmers to implement new technologies, insufficient
technical support from public or private agencies, regional disparities in
the allocation of credits,8 and lack of monitoring to ensure compliance
[35,96]. Projected climate variations call for further agricultural risk-
management policies. Some steps have been taken to integrate climate
Fig. 4. Simulated future productivity across Brazil under climate change for various land-uses in comparison to the 2001–2010 decade. Colour bar units are in units
of gC/m2, where high productivity is represented by dark green colours and low productivity grey-white. The data were generated by the LPJml4 model ([91,92])
(For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article).
8 A substantial fraction of the funding is allocated to farmers from the Centre-
West, Southeast and South, in detriment to the North and Northeast regions.
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change scenarios when amending existing public policies that address
climate risks in agriculture. However, implementation challenges re-
main, mainly as regards the ability of the public sector to put in practice
the required policy adjustments and to address social and regional
economic disparities. Meanwhile, more sound water and electricity
policy could contribute in alleviating risks of food availability crises
(see Section 3.2), while land-use policy itself affects the land's water
recycling ability and thus influences the availability of water and en-
ergy [35,37,97].
3.5. Water-energy-food – indirect land-use change and deforestation
The deforestation of the Amazon was initially attributed, besides
infrastructure extension and selective logging [98], to expanding cattle
and soy industries [47]. Deforestation was shown to be statistically
related to changes in the international soy price [47]. However, it was
later established that the expansion of soybean crops takes place at the
expense of pastures, which are less profitable, and that it is the in-
creasing search for new pastureland that predominantly accounts for
forest clearing [34,44,45]. In other words, soybeans producers are not
directly responsible for setting fire to the forest for clearing purposes.
Yet, soybean producers are not merely displacing cattle ranchers; they
are also acquiring newly deforested land from them. Indeed, cattle
ranchers often speculate on the future sale price of the land they want
to deforest and the land is used for grazing until it is sold to soybean
farmers [48]. How illegally deforested land is initially acquired is not
fully clear, although it seems to be a combination of deficient land re-
gistration, poor law enforcement, legal loopholes, bribes and risk-
taking.
A close relationship exists between the Brazilian soybean industry
and the Chinese meat industry [99]. China imports over half of Brazil's
production of soybeans to supply fast growing pork and poultry in-
dustries (Figs. 5 and 6a-b), for direct human consumption of derivatives
(oil, flour, etc), and to produce biodiesel. China's demand for meat
follows its fast domestic income growth, allowing consumers to eat
meat more frequently. Due to their high protein content, soybeans are
predominantly used to feed animals.
China's consumption of soybeans has far outpaced its domestic
production (Fig. 6c-d), partly as a result of its water shortages. In-
creasing desertification in areas previously used to grow this crop has
indirectly transferred production to Brazil [99]. Under climate change
scenarios, larger amounts of land-use may be transferred from China to
Brazil in this way.
The USA is the largest producer of soybeans in the world. However,
its soybean cropland area is not expanding, and thus production growth
allocates itself to Brazil, which has historically been able to accom-
modate it. Meanwhile, the sugarcane-based ethanol industry is also
growing in Brazil, expanding far outside of its traditional growing re-
gion in the State of São Paulo [93]. It could potentially occupy land
currently used for soybean crops or cattle, depending on prices, and
trigger ever more complex cascades of ILUC and deforestation [46].
As stated in Sections 2.2 and 3.3, deforestation of the Amazon and
of the Cerrado could in fact also explain changes in the water cycle that
has led to water scarcity in cities and in the hydroelectric system. It is
well established that cutting trees down reduces evapotranspiration.
Roots pump belowground water vertically upward, it then transpires
through the leaves and the resulting humidity rises to the atmosphere to
form clouds. Over the Amazon this biotic pump is so powerful that the
resulting pressure difference attracts additional humidity from the
Atlantic, which in return falls down as rain in the Eastern/ North-
eastern Amazon. Deforestation has recently been shown to alter the
feedback between land and atmosphere in the water cycle [37]. While
this is not fully established, water scarcity events thus could potentially
ultimately be associated to ILUC and to the expansion of food com-
modity production for exports.
From 2004–2014, deforestation in the Amazon Forest slowed down
in Brazil due to a complex combination of factors. Amongst the public
policies adopted by Brazilian authorities, the 2004 Action Plan for
Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm
– SI.21 and 22) has achieved effective results in monitoring, controlling
and taking enforcement actions in areas affected by deforestation. The
PPCDAm includes the regularization of occupied federal public lands,
the expansion of protected areas, the granting of legal status to in-
digenous land, and some restrictions in access to credit from public
financial institutions imposed on those who have infringed environ-
mental legislation.
Whereas such policies partly explain the slowing down in defor-
estation in the Amazon, other important factors include a temporary
slowdown in the demand for soy and beef, intensification of beef pro-
duction, and measures targeting the supply-chain governance of these
commodities. Amongst the latter, of note are the moratoria on soy
(SI.23) and beef produced on recently deforested land and steps to meet
technical standards in foreign markets [46,100,101], including a cer-
tificate system for sustainable soy, managed by the Roundtable for
Responsible Soy (SI.17). These developments are encouraging but,
realistically, their effectiveness will be truly tested when international
demand for soy and beef is again on the rise.
With a lower level of protection than the Amazon, the Cerrado has
lost half of its native vegetation, mainly due to forest fires, agriculture
and cattle rearing [102]. In 2014, a variant of the PPCDAm was de-
veloped for the Cerrado, the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of
Deforestation and Fires in the Cerrado (PPCerrado – SI.24). However,
although the Brazilian government has expressed the intention to ex-
tend the moratoria on soy and beef to the Cerrado (MMA, 2016 – SI.25),
so far it remains restricted to the Amazon.
The Forest Code enacted in 2012 (SI.26) establishes rules for the
protection of native vegetation in private rural lands, including in the
Amazon and in the Cerrado. The Forest Code is a result of an intense
debate, confronting the interests of environmentalists and the agribu-
siness’ economic lobby. Environmentalists were staunchly opposed to
the Forest Code's amnesty for illegal deforestation that occurred before
2008 [103] and to the disparities in the conservation requirements for
Legal Reserve (LR), which are more rigorous for the Amazon than for
the Cerrado. While 80% of native vegetation of the Amazon on large
land holdings cannot be lawfully cleared, in the Cerrado the protection
targets range from 20% (for the majority of the biome) to 35% (for the
Fig. 5. Meat production around the world, for bovine, pork and poultry. Data
from FAOSTAT 2017.
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portion of the Cerrado within the Legal Amazon).
The Forest Code forbids the clearing of Permanent Protected Areas
(PPA), and establishes new mechanisms to improve the conservation of
forests, such as the Environmental Rural Register (CAR). The CAR is a
national public electronic registry, mandatory for all rural properties. It
requires property owners and landholders to show proof of ownership
or land-use and to declare the geo-referenced property boundaries and
remnant vegetation areas on their land, including protected areas such
as the LR and PPA. The CAR is expected to enhance monitoring, en-
vironmental and economic planning, and enforcement of the environ-
mental legislation against deforestation [104].
Yet, it is not clear whether these measures for reduction in defor-
estation are sufficient, given that demand for agricultural commodities
continues to grow at a rapid pace, creating ever stronger economic
incentives to create more agricultural land, through legal or illegal
pathways [105]. A long-standing problem of property rights exists in
remote areas [48]. Under Brazilian Law, acquisition and maintenance
of the property rights require evidence of the productive use of land,
putting landowners and squatters in competition for control over land
[106]. Landowners clear forest for pasture or agriculture, as evidence of
productivity to avoid risk of confiscation and redistribution amongst
squatters [107]. Clearing forest is also a strategy used by landowners to
protect the land from illegal occupation by squatters [107], leading to
both a tragedy of the commons effect and challenges to law enforce-
ment [48].
The combination of climate change, climate policy and growing
food consumption internationally could unleash a new complex defor-
estation storm in Brazil, depending on how it is governed. Recent evi-
dence suggests that deforestation rates in the Amazon are increasing
again, and in the Cerrado it has never been under control.9 Climate
change will reduce land productivity, forcing rent-seeking farmers to
source additional cropland, which would likely be supplied through
ILUC. Climate policy, inside and outside Brazil, could develop a sub-
stantial global demand for biofuels, which could induce larger expan-
sion of sugarcane plantations leading to additional ILUC. Globally
growing demand for meat and biofuels can give rise to unprecedented
pressures on remaining natural resources and forests in Brazil.
Brazil is taking measures to fight deforestation. Policy-makers ex-
pect that once the Forest Code mechanism CAR is fully implemented,
deforestation will decrease due to clearer land tenure rights, a more
accurate land registry and better law enforcement [104]. However,
while crucial, this approach does not tackle international demand for
commodities as an underlying driver, further affected by climate
change pressures. The combination of inter-sectoral agriculture, forest
policies and trade measures, at the global level, could be part of a
broader and more effective solution. The moratoria on soy is an ex-
ample of the supply-chain governance of commodities that has helped
reduce deforestation for soy in the Amazon, although it does not in fact
prevent ILUC [108]. The supply-chain governance can include other
policies, such as certification and labelling requirements, although the
certificate system for sustainable soy in Brazil has not been as effective
as the moratorium on soy, mainly due to higher risks for producers not
selling their produce [109].
In conclusion, what emerges from studying ILUC and Amazon/
Cerrado deforestation in Brazil is that many processes contribute to this
effect, all of which are Nexus-related and involve all scales from local to
global: (1) global demand for agricultural commodities (notably soy-
beans going to China for meat production) requires increasing amounts
of land; (2) existing policies prevent direct land-use change but not
ILUC, incentivising the use of loop-holes in which complex ILUC cas-
cades emerge; (3) climate change, deforestation and associated changes
in the water cycle lead to changes in the productivity of the land, and
crop yields, which may exacerbate land scarcity and accelerate the
process of ILUC and deforestation; and finally, (4) insufficiently re-
silient governance structures are made weaker by strong economic in-
centives for land grabbing to produce ever larger amounts of food
Fig. 6. a) Main crops produced in
Brazil. The inset shows the same data
for clarity. b) Main export destinations
for soybeans. c-d) Balance of soybeans
in Brazil and China. The ‘domestic
supply’ equals ‘production’ plus ‘im-
ports’ minus ‘exports’, while ‘food’ de-
notes domestic consumption as food.
‘Feed’ denotes direct (unprocessed) use
to feed animals, although soybeans
mostly go through ‘processing’ before
they are used as feed. Over 50% of
soybeans produced in Brazil are des-
tined for the Chinese market, processed
there for feeding pigs. Data from
FAOSTAT 2017.
9 See “Projeto PRODES: Monitoramento da floresta Amazônia Brasileira por
satélite.” [The PRODES Project Monitoring the Brazilian Amazon forest by sa-
tellite], http://www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/prodes_1988_2016n.htm, and also
http://www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/index.php.
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commodities for export. However, deforestation could lead to the ulti-
mate downfall of the whole Brazilian agribusiness as the Amazon and
Cerrado biomes are irreversibly altered. Thus, the issue of ILUC and
deforestation affects all nodes and aspects of the Nexus in Brazil: water
security (deforestation destabilises the water cycle), food security
(competition for land between the agri-business and other uses) and
energy security (water instability affecting rainfall and hydropower,
land availability for biofuel feedstocks).
4. Policy implications
It is challenging to devise clear policy implications when faced with
a ‘wicked’ problem such as the Nexus, precisely for the reasons that
define a ‘wicked’ problem: knowledge is incomplete, and optimal so-
lutions can by definition not be identified. Possible optimal solutions
identified with current knowledge are only ever illusory, as new in-
formation and scientific advances change the constraints of optimisa-
tion problems, leading to different solutions, while ad-hoc assumptions
that could be used to cover for missing knowledge can lead to mis-
leading conclusions. A profound recognition of the complexity of the
Nexus and of our limited understanding is paramount to making any
progress addressing the Nexus with public policies.
Table 1 summarises the Nexus challenges surveyed in this article.
Fig. 7a illustrates the Brazilian Nexus with its external influences re-
lated to global economic and environmental change, and relevant in-
stitutions at various scales. Fig. 7b illustrates a proposed science-policy-
law bridge. These elements must be recalled as context for the policy
implications of our approach.
Nexus-resilient policy-making requires integration and consistency
of action across sectors according to current scientific knowledge. It is
important to note, however, that we do not recommend the creation of
integrated ministries, or of a Nexus government department. By con-
trast, we recommend an enhancement of the science-policy interface for
all governance institutions in order to make it Nexus-savvy. This can be
achieved in two main forms. First, following the EU approach to impact
assessment of policy frameworks [110], we recommend using a scien-
tific board of Nexus experts to check for Nexus feedbacks in proposed
policies, using a standardised procedure that makes use of Nexus
modelling tools, that promotes finding empirical evidence and makes
use of qualitative studies on the coherence of new and existing
regulations and law. Secondly, a similar interface, and possibly the
same board, could be used to design policies based on knowledge of
Nexus feedbacks. A possible example, in the Brazilian case, would be
the adoption of an export duty on soybeans. Indeed, as Nexus feedbacks
at the global level suggest that increasing demand for soybeans from
China (due to the trade war with the US) will renew pressures on land
use and deforestation, one potential avenue to counteract this phe-
nomenon would be to introduce in Brazil an export duty on soybeans,
the rate of which would be progressive (growing more than pro-
portionally with the increase in the export volume) so as to counteract
exports that are ‘excessive’ in terms of the pressure on land use they are
likely to cause. Such a policy does not require administrative re-
organisation or any substantial institutional integration. It is a simply
targeted policy, which would be based on knowledge of the Nexus
feedbacks (the above-studied ILUC).
The Nexus-savvy input provided by the proposed boards or other
similar networks of Nexus experts could be organised in different ways
according to the structure of the science and policy interface in a given
country. One key consideration in making such interfaces functional
and useful to policy-makers and other stakeholders is the interface's
iterative nature or ‘bidirectional’ character (Fig. 7c). It should involve
policy-makers and stakeholders expressing their needs and normative
views to policy-analysts, department experts and legal experts, who
would interpret this information to either develop or test detailed
policy proposals within existing windows of opportunity and build an
evidence-base that will ultimately support these proposals under a
parliament vote. By obtaining results, Nexus experts can convey their
findings to policy-makers and stakeholders, who can then adjust their
requirements and strategies or, alternatively, ask for further analysis
under additional political parameters. Through an iterative process, the
policy frameworks eventually identified would be supported by a sub-
stantial evidence-base, which can be politically tested in parliament.
The science-policy bridge should be used continuously as policy is
implemented, it effectiveness evaluated over time, more data and better
models become available, and as the nature of policy problems evolve.
5. Conclusion
Although Brazil has to some extent responded to Nexus challenges,
such measures do not fully address the complex interconnections within
Table 1
Summary of Nexus challenges in Brazil.
Case Study Challenges
Environmental Socio-economic Policy
W-E: Hydro-electricity • Water scarcity• Competition among users• Reserve thermoelectric plants
increase GHG emissions• Dam projects in the Amazon affect
biodiversity and indigenous land.
• Energy security• Overreliance on hydroelectricity• Diversification of the energy matrix,
increasing non-hydro renewable• Investment in new capacity, due to
increasing energy demand
• Improving policy-coherence• Incorporating climate change impacts in long-term
energy planning• Reducing reliance on water resources in long-term
energy planning• Elaborating plan for high potential renewables
E-F: Biofuels • Crop expansion beyond traditional
areas• ILUC• Water use• Unsustainable agricultural practices
including sugarcane burning for
manual harvesting
• Biofuel crops displace food crops• ILUC leading to deforestation• Competition for land can threaten food
security (non-cash crops)
• Defining protected areas and areas suitable for
expansion for energy crop production.• Reducing burning practices and developing
mechanisation• Linking national policy with the international
framework of global commodities governance,
including certification schemes.
W-F: Food production • Rise in frequency of extreme weather
events, floods, droughts• Changes in temperature and rain
patterns affect crop yield
• Changes in land productivity produce
crop and people migration and changes in
agricultural output
• Adapting existing policies (e.g., ZARC), and creating
new policies, that incorporate climate change
uncertainty and risk management
W-E-F: Deforestation • Deforestation• Land degradation• Potential Amazon collapse
• Expansion of soy plantations• Displacement of pastures• ILUC leading to deforestation• Unclear or absent property rights• Land grabbing
• Strengthening national policies against deforestation,
including law enforcement, monitoring, regulation of
property ownership and land tenure rights• Linking national policy with the international
framework of global commodities governance
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the Nexus. This is partly due to limited understanding of the underlying
drivers. For example, the full causation chain in ILUC still needs to be
elucidated, and some of the policy responses may have to be taken
beyond Brazil. Albeit not exhaustive, Table 1 covers the most pressing
challenges currently faced by Brazil. Solutions to the policy challenges
are not straightforward and, therefore, there is a clear need for more
knowledge on the dynamics involved in each of the processes discussed.
A Nexus approach to science-informed policy-making must involve,
primarily, an effort to integrate and condense existing knowledge in all
of the domains concerned, to be delivered to decision-makers, in di-
gestible form, across the various scales of governance in Brazil. This
requires a change in the scientific approach to Nexus problems [21]. As
illustrated by the four case studies reviewed, energy, water and food are
highly interrelated in Brazil, such that policy for managing one likely
affects the other two in sometimes unpredictable ways. A nexus
approach is one that not only captures these interlinkages, but that does
so in a way that is understandable and actionable by decision-makers
that are currently organised sectorially and at different scales.
In order to make it understandable and actionable, we submit that
the scientific analysis of the Nexus interlinkages in Brazil has to rely on
three key considerations: (a) a different type of modelling, in which
unrealistic social planner assumptions are abandoned, giving voice in-
stead to complex interdisciplinary phenomena and path-dependency,
while allowing for incomplete knowledge and uncertainty; (b) a more
interactive and integrative approach to understanding the problems and
conveying the solutions, whereby (i) the sectorial and federal/state/
municipal stakeholders are both providers of data and receivers of in-
tegrated (modelled) analysis, (ii) the state of the system is understood
not only from a natural science perspective but also from that of the
political economy, politics and legal constraints both in Brazil and
Fig. 7. Schematic representation of the Nexus and relevant Brazilian institutions, and of the science-policy interface. A) The Nexus involves global to local inter-
actions, and strong interactions between the actions of each institution in each of its nodes. Each institution is attached to one of the sectors. B) Different regimes of
policy integration are illustrated using layers. In the fully fragmented policy situation, interactions exist between institutions and frameworks for each node of the
Nexus and climate change, without interactions across nodes. In a situation of higher degrees of communication, interactions exist between institutions and between
nodes and climate change-related institutions. However, in a desired Nexus integrated framework, coordinated interaction takes place between nodes of the Nexus in
a framework defined by climate policy. C) The science-policy-law interface involves an iterative dialogue between policy-makers and scientists, mediated/translated
by policy analysts and legal experts.
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elsewhere, and (iii) the sectorial and federal/state/municipal stake-
holders participate in the scientific analysis; and finally (c) the inter-
actions between the global and the local are fully taken into account,
both in the design of the model (i.e. in (a)) and in the type of partici-
pation (i.e. in (b)), with potentially transnational interdisciplinary pa-
nels and discussions. This approach would not only translate into more
participation but also into policy approaches that account for con-
straints arising from previous actions (in Brazil, but also e.g. in China,
the EU, the US and in the governance of international trade), as sug-
gested by the ILUC phenomenon. The case of Brazil is therefore in-
formative well beyond Brazilian policy.
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